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The Danny Williams Government, 2003–2010: 
“Masters in Our Own House”?
Douglas House
Introduction
Danny Williams was Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador for just 
over seven years, from 6 November 2003 to 3 December 2010. His 
principal claim, which resonated well with the electorate at the time, 
was that, under his leadership, the province would become “masters in 
our own house,” thereby breaking its long-term dependency on the fed-
eral government and outside corporations. This approach appeared to 
be successful during his years as Premier. Due mainly to a huge increase 
in the price of oil that coincided with Williams’s premiership, New-
foundland and Labrador prospered as never before (or since). For the 
first and only time since Confederation with Canada in 1949, it became 
a “have province.” As the province prospered, Williams’s reputation 
soared. He became one of the most popular provincial premiers in Ca-
nadian history. Unlike most of his predecessors, Williams was just as 
popular when he announced his retirement in the fall of 2010 as he had 
been at any time during his premiership. In retrospect, however, Wil-
liams’s reputation has been sullied by his leadership role in the ill-fated 
Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project, which Williams had announced 
with great fanfare just a week before he announced his retirement.
This article reviews Williams’s premiership, focusing on his efforts 
at economic and social development.1 The main body of the article 
focuses on the seven years when Williams was Premier. But, because 
of his leadership role in initiating it, the final section reviews the 
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Muskrat Falls project briefly and how it might affect Williams’s repu-
tation in the long run.
A Premier in Waiting
Danny Williams was unique among Newfoundland and Labrador 
premiers in that his accession to the premiership was long anticipated 
by many people in the province. Williams was born in St. John’s on 4 
August 1949, just five months after Confederation. Hence, he just 
missed out on being born a Newfoundlander and grew up during the 
first years of the erstwhile country becoming the tenth province of 
Canada.2 Williams was very much a “townie,” and an upper-mid-
dle-class townie at that. The Williams family were avid Progressive 
Conservatives (PCs) as behind-the-scenes supporters, organizers, and 
election campaigners for the party. Hence, Danny Williams grew up as 
a Progressive Conservative, but one for whom progressive was the more 
important part of the name. He told me that he was fiscally conserva-
tive but socially progressive.3 This helps explain his later disdain for 
Stephen Harper and his more right-wing conservatism.
Although Williams was very much a city boy, he had an outgoing 
personality and a way of getting along with people from all walks of 
life that resonated well with rural Newfoundlanders and Labrador-
ians. Danny was always “one of the boys,” albeit a very successful one. 
Even before he went into politics, he was known as “Danny” in a way 
that was reminiscent of Newfoundland and Labrador’s first Premier, 
Joseph Smallwood, being known simply as “Joey.”
Williams received his early education at St. Bonaventure’s College 
and Gonzaga High School in St. John’s. He earned a degree in politi-
cal science and economics from Memorial University and, in his grad-
uating year, was awarded the Rhodes Scholarship for Newfoundland 
and Labrador for 1969. At Oxford, he studied arts and law, and then 
went on to Dalhousie University where he completed his LL.B. Start-
ing in 1972, Williams became a successful lawyer, taking on several 
high-profile cases, including the Mount Cashel Orphanage sexual 
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abuse scandal. He was appointed Queen’s Counsel in 1984. Concur-
rent with building his law practice, Williams also took the lead in de-
veloping Newfoundland’s first cable television company, Avalon Ca-
blevision. This became one of the biggest and most successful cable 
television companies in Atlantic Canada.
Over the years, Williams had maintained his interest in politics, 
and was approached from time to time about running for office. But 
he did not feel inclined to become involved in the all-consuming life 
of a political leader while he and his wife were raising their children. 
By the year 2000, however, his children had grown up, he had turned 
50 the year before, the ruling Liberal Party was looking vulnerable 
after Brian Tobin’s hasty exit and a bitter leadership contest, and he 
felt that the time was ripe for him to devote the next 10 years of his life 
to politics. A change of government was in the air if the PCs could 
find a dynamic new leader. The obvious choice, when he became avail-
able, was Danny Williams.
To clear the way for this radical change in careers, Williams felt 
that he first had to get rid of his major asset, the cable company, be-
cause he couldn’t find himself in a position of sending out bills to 
thousands of people if he were also their Premier. So he sold the com-
pany, reportedly for over $200 million. This put him in an advanta-
geous position: “I was in a position where I had independent wealth, 
it’s nice to have financial autonomy, and I could be totally my own 
person.”
Williams recognized, however, that running a government is a 
very different proposition to running a business or a law firm. 
Preparing to Govern
Danny Williams became the leader of the provincial Progressive Con-
servative Party in April of 2001 and won a by-election in the west 
coast district of Humber West. Initially, Williams felt impatient for 
the next provincial election. The incumbent Liberal Premier, Roger 
Grimes, however, had his own agenda and priorities that he wanted to 
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address as best he could. Realistically, Grimes recognized that he was 
likely to lose the next election, so he hung on for as long as he could.4 
Eventually, the election was called for 21 October 2003, two-and-a-
half years after Williams had become leader of the official opposition.
Reflecting on this 13 years later, Williams recognized that the 
long wait was a positive advantage for him and his team: “I was think-
ing that there would probably be an election sooner rather than later. 
As it happened there wasn’t, which was probably the best thing that 
ever happened to me, because I realized that I had a huge learning 
curve ahead of me as far as government and running a province went.”
The key advantage was that Williams, his senior policy advisor, 
Lorne Wheeler, and the other members of his team were able to pre-
pare thoroughly in advance of forming the government. Williams em-
phasized how important these preparatory years were to his premier-
ship. He and his team, made up mainly of himself, Lorne Wheeler, 
and senior members of what was then a small opposition caucus, 
drafted a document that would serve as both an election platform and 
a blueprint for the two terms for which Williams hoped to be Premier. 
It was, in Wheeler’s term, a “rolling document” that kept being revised 
and re-revised many times before it was finalized. 
While this was a multi-faceted document, Williams’s main focus 
from the outset was “three major things that I wanted to tackle.” The 
first was our relationship with the federal government and our share of 
the offshore. “We didn’t need $5 million cheques, we needed bil-
lion-dollar cheques.” Although the Atlantic Accord, signed in 1985, 
had stated the fundamental principle that Newfoundland and Labra-
dor should be the primary beneficiary of its offshore oil and gas re-
sources, this was not happening in practice. The second major battle 
was with the oil companies to ensure that the province received a larg-
er share of revenues from the offshore. The third was Churchill Falls, 
“that’s got to be tackled as well. I took on the federal government first, 
then I took on the oil companies and finished up with Churchill Falls, 
and then basically my bucket list was done.”
The final version of the plan was called Our Blueprint for the 
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Future.5 Because it proved to be an important document in practice, 
not just a party platform to be shelved once the election was over, I will 
discuss it here in an introductory way, and refer to some of its specific 
action items later. The Williams government’s plan, or “the blue book,” 
as it was generally referred to in government circles, guided the ap-
proach and actions of the government during Williams’s premiership. 
Several senior officials within the provincial government commented 
on this to me. They were surprised and impressed by the extent to 
which the Premier and his ministers really did attempt to oversee the 
implementation of most of the items included in the blue book. Many 
of the items were implemented more or less as envisioned, such as the 
establishment of an energy corporation, the implementation of a pov-
erty reduction strategy, and the passing of a sustainable development 
act. Some were modified in implementation, for example, the pro-
posed Chief Information/Innovation Office position was divided in 
two: a Chief Information Officer as a stand-alone agency and an 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Innovation within the Department of 
Innovation, Trade and Rural Development. A few items, such as the 
building of a fixed link between the island and Labrador, were re-
searched but not acted on as they would have proven to be too costly. 
The First Year: The Fiscal Challenge and Labour Relations
After he had stretched his premiership to the limit, Roger Grimes 
called for a provincial election in the fall of 2003. Danny Williams and 
his party won the election, capturing 34 of the 48 seats in the House 
of Assembly and nearly 59 per cent of the popular vote. The new gov-
ernment took office on 6 November 2003. In the short term, however, 
Williams, his newly minted Minister of Finance, Loyola Sullivan, and 
the rest of his cabinet and government were stalled in their intention 
to implement their blue book plan. In what by now had become a 
familiar pattern in government transitions in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, they found that the financial state of the province and its 
government was more precarious than they had realized. The new 
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government commissioned an independent assessment of the province’s 
finances by the chartered accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
which confirmed that action needed to be taken on the province’s 
debt. It had stood at around $6 billion in 1992–93 and threatened to 
reach almost $16 billion by 2007–08. Williams and Sullivan deter-
mined that their first order of business had to be to get the provincial 
government’s fiscal house in order. 
To deal with what it viewed as an immediate debt crisis, the gov-
ernment took several measures. The most controversial were their in-
tentions to downsize the public service by 4,000 and to freeze the 
wages of public servants for two years. At the same time, Williams 
promised the public servants that they would be recompensed in the 
future when the fiscal situation of the province improved. The govern-
ment also instructed every department and agency of the provincial 
government to propose ways in which their annual budgets could be 
cut by 20 per cent.
These measures were felt as a betrayal by the main public-sector 
union, the Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public Em-
ployees (NAPE), many members of which had voted PC in the recent 
election, and by the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of La-
bour (NLFL) and its president at the time, Reg Anstey. NAPE mem-
bers voted for strike action and Anstey made some uncomplimentary 
comments about Danny Williams in the local media. Tension was 
heightened when the government passed legislation that ended the 
strike and forced the public servants back to work.
This was a difficult time for the Williams government. Williams’s 
popularity dropped to the lowest it was ever to be, and his relationship 
with organized labour got off to a rocky start.
Non-Renewable Resources: An Oil Bonanza and Mining Growth
The 1985 Atlantic Accord stated that its fundamental purpose was “to 
recognize the right of Newfoundland and Labrador to be the principal 
beneficiary of the oil and gas resources off its shores, consistent with 
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the requirement for a strong and united Canada.”6 The Accord on the 
whole is a strong document, but its one weakness is its ambiguity 
about the role of equalization payments in determining what is meant 
by “principal beneficiary.” Since Canada’s equalization program in-
cludes revenues from non-renewable natural resources as part of its 
complicated formula, as offshore oil revenues increase, provincial rev-
enues from equalization would decrease by a similar amount. Hence, 
there would be no net benefit to the province. Recognizing this, the 
architects of the original Accord included a section on equalization 
offset payments. This, too, was complicated, with Part I offset pay-
ments to last for 12 years from the commencement of first production, 
and then Part II offset payments “equivalent to 90 percent of any de-
crease in the fiscal equalization payment to Newfoundland in respect 
of a fiscal year in comparison with the payment for the immediately 
preceding fiscal year.” Beginning in the first fiscal year of offshore pro-
duction, “this offset rate shall be reduced by ten percentage points and 
by ten percentage points in each subsequent year.”7
The unintended consequence of this provision was that, over the 
years, when equalization payments are included in the calculation, 
the federal government’s net benefit from Newfoundland and Labra-
dor’s offshore oil production greatly exceeded that of the provincial 
government. In a background paper prepared for the province’s Royal 
Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, 
John Crosbie, who as federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
of Canada was one of the signatories to the 1985 Accord, concluded 
as follows:
In my opinion, it is clear that while Newfoundland ful-
filled its major responsibilities under the Atlantic Accord, 
the federal government has not to date, and will increas-
ingly fall short since Newfoundland is clearly not the 
principal beneficiary of offshore resources. Under current 
projections, it is the view of Newfoundland that Canada 
is receiving the dominant share of offshore revenues, 
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estimated at 79 percent when its incremental corporate, 
personal, sales and other taxes as well as its “equalization 
savings” from the clawback are taken into account.8
Whether Crosbie’s calculations were precise or not, the main point is 
clear. When equalization effects are taken into account, with revenue 
from non-renewable resources included in their calculation, New-
foundland and Labrador was far from being the main beneficiary of its 
offshore oil production. This glaring fact was the starting point for 
Danny Williams’s battles with Ottawa and the major oil companies 
operating in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore.
Fortunately for the new Premier, there was a minority federal 
government in Ottawa at the time, led by Prime Minister Paul Martin. 
Martin’s power base was precarious as the country headed towards a 
federal election in 2004. This meant that Newfoundland and Labra-
dor’s seven federal seats could prove crucial in tipping the balance in 
the forthcoming election. Williams was in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion than is usual for the premier of a small province. And he had the 
personality and strength of will to take full advantage of this opportu-
nity. Martin promised verbally to agree to a revision of the Atlantic 
Accord that would honour the principle of Newfoundland and Labra-
dor being the principal beneficiary of its offshore oil. Just before 
Christmas in 2003, Williams flew to Winnipeg for a meeting with the 
Liberal Minister of Finance, Ralph Goodale, in the expectation that 
this verbal commitment was to be confirmed officially.
And then when I got out there, the local minister, John 
Efford, wasn’t even there. As soon as I saw that I said 
“Okay, there’s nothing happening here today.” On the way 
back, I decided that it was time to take the flag down.
Williams’s tactic of taking down the Canadian flag at all provin-
cial government buildings was controversial and caused a furor in the 
country. Nevertheless, a few days later, Paul Martin agreed to meet 
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with Williams and between them they hammered out an agreement 
on what they called the Atlantic Accord 2005. Paul Martin’s version of 
events was rather different from the “capitulation” that he was accused 
of by mainland pundits. According to Martin, he was sympathetic 
from the outset to Newfoundland’s case and fully intended to follow 
through on his earlier promise.
The problem was Danny didn’t know how to take yes for 
an answer, so we got into some awful damn fights. But, 
anyway, I carried through. I made the change so that New-
foundland was taken care of. I made the offer to Danny 
before he even asked for it. I really felt that this had a lot 
to do with Newfoundland but it also had a lot to do with 
my view of the country.9
Whatever the course of the negotiations between Williams and Martin, 
the outcome was very favourable to Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Paul Martin agreed to amend the Atlantic Accord to the effect that 
the government of Canada would “provide additional offset payments 
to the province in respect of offshore-related Equalization reductions, 
effectively allowing it to retain the benefit of 100 percent of its off-
shore resource revenues.”10 This agreement would be in effect initially 
from 2004 to 2012, reduced gradually for the period 2012 to 2019 if 
the province was no longer eligible for equalization (it wasn’t, having 
become a “have province” in 2008), and reviewed in 2019. To put it 
into effect, Ottawa provided the government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador with an advance payment of $2 billion to reduce its out-
standing debt. Danny Williams returned to the province triumphantly, 
pumping his fist and shouting “We got it! We got it!” He received a 
hero’s welcome at St. John’s airport.
Having successfully negotiated a satisfactory deal with the federal 
government, Williams then turned his attention to the second item 
on his bucket list, the negotiation of a better deal with the oil compa-
nies for the development of subsequent oil and gas projects offshore. 
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Williams took what he called a three-pronged approach — to get 
greater royalties, to get an equity share in the new fields as they were 
developed, and to get more processing in the province. The third was 
used mainly as a bargaining tool, conceding privately that, because 
there was already a surplus of refineries and petrochemical complexes 
where you really needed a huge critical mass, it was unlikely that he 
would succeed on this front. So he held this in reserve as something 
that he could appear to concede on in order to get his way on his 
equity and royalty objectives.
Direct participation through demanding an equity position was 
controversial. Although common practice in most oil-producing 
jurisdictions around the world, it was not the common practice in the 
United States and Canada. The oil companies’ resistance was due in 
part to their concern about setting a new precedent for their North 
American operations. Williams believed that taking a small equity 
position would have two important benefits. The first is that, over time, 
the province would almost certainly receive a positive return on its 
investment through its share of the profits once the new fields began 
producing. The second, equally important, benefit is that by becoming 
a shareholder, the province would have a seat at the table of the board 
of directors of the project, and thereby have access to information that 
otherwise the companies would hold close to their chests. Participa-
tion would also contribute to provincial officials gaining more exper-
tise about the workings of the industry. This approach, however, is 
costly in the short term and, if oil prices were to fall later (as they did), 
risky in the long term.
These were the basic considerations that guided Williams’s nego-
tiations for the development of Newfoundland and Labrador’s third 
major oil field after Hibernia and White Rose, the Hebron/Ben Nev-
is field. The oil companies’ first response to Williams’s three demands 
was to refuse and to threaten to walk away from the project. Like 
Brian Peckford in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Williams came 
under a lot of pressure, including from the local business community, 
to relent and make a deal so that the project with its attendant business 
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activity and employment benefits could get underway. But Williams 
was adamant in his position.
As world oil prices rose dramatically during the mid- to late 
2000s, ExxonMobil, the largest shareholder and operator for the 
Hebron project, did come back to the negotiating table. Williams con-
ceded on his third condition, local processing, and the operator and its 
private-sector partners agreed to the province taking a 4.9 per cent 
equity position in the Hebron project. They also agreed to an enhanced 
royalty regime, including a super royalty if and when the price of oil 
was to exceed $50 a barrel. Subsequently, the precedent having been 
set, the provincial government was able to negotiate similar deals on 
the West White Rose project (5 per cent equity) and the Hibernia 
Southern Extension project (10 per cent equity).
If Clyde Wells was the unluckiest post-Confederation Premier of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, due to the serious province-wide crisis 
induced by the groundfish moratoria of the early 1990s, Danny Wil-
liams was the luckiest, due to the dramatic increase in the world price 
of oil during the first decade of the twenty-first century. As Table 1 and 
Figure 1 show, the price of oil per barrel rose from US$35.91 in 2003 
to US$102.49 in 2008. The percentage of the province’s GDP from 
mining and petroleum also jumped, from 27 per cent in 2003 to a high 
of 46 per cent in 2008, considerably higher than the other main Cana-
dian oil-producing provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan (Table 2).
In addition to the dramatic rise in provincial revenues from off-
shore oil developments, the Danny Williams years also enjoyed a sig-
nificant rise in revenues from the mining industry, primarily from the 
Voisey’s Bay nickel project. While in opposition, mainly for political 
reasons, Williams had expressed skepticism about the project. Never-
theless, it proved to be highly successful and, ironically, it was his 
government rather than his predecessor’s that enjoyed most of the in-
creased government revenues generated by the project. Thus, in the 
provincial government’s projections for 2007–08, for example, in addi-
tion to the $1.25 billion direct revenues from offshore oil, the province 
also anticipated getting over $200 million from mining operations.11 
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Williams and his Minister of Natural Resources, Kathy Dunderdale, 
managed to negotiate a revision of the 2002 agreement in 2009 that 
ensured even greater benefits for the province as a condition for Vale 
Inco being given an extension for completing the construction of the 
hydromet processing plant at Long Harbour.12
The combination of the benefits from both the original Atlantic 
Accord of 1985 and the amendment of 2004, coinciding with a dra-
matic increase in the price of oil during the Williams years and supple-
mented by increased income from the mining sector, induced a period 
of fiscal well-being for the Newfoundland and Labrador government 
such as has never been seen before or since. This allowed the tone of the 
Williams government’s throne speeches and budget speeches to be 
positive, upbeat, confident, and optimistic in a way that contrasted to 
most of their predecessors and successors. As Table 3 shows, the gov-























Imported Crude Oil Price Per Barrel (2015 US Dollars), 1968-2016
Figure 1. Imported crude oil price per barrel (US$ 2015), 1968–2016
Notes: Prices for 2015 and 2016 are projections based on the short-term energy 
outlook model; “p” refers to the projected price per barrel. All prices are in December 
2015 US dollars.
Source: Short-Term Energy Outlook, December 2015, U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices.
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Table 1. Imported crude oil price per barrel (US$ 2015), 1968–2016.
Year Price per Barrel Year Price per Barrel
1968 19.86 1993 26.61
1969 18.18 1994 24.98
1970 18.18 1995 26.81
1971 18.65 1996 31.33
1972 18.36 1997 27.45
1973 21.90 1998 17.64
1974 60.52 1999 24.71
1975 61.75 2000 38.37
1976 56.44 2001 29.60
1977 57.11 2002 31.42
1978 53.22 2003 35.91
1979 70.83 2004 45.28
1980 97.94 2005 59.66
1981 97.23 2006 69.82
1982 82.87 2007 77.22
1983 70.15 2008 102.49
1984 66.21 2009 65.57
1985 59.78 2010 82.86
1986 30.27 2011 108.68
1987 38.04 2012 104.92
1988 29.42 2013 100.37
1989 34.75 2014 90.24
1990 39.64 2015 47.54p
1991 32.77 2016 46.91p
1992 30.93
Note: Prices for 2015 and 2016 are projections based on the short-term energy out-
look model. All prices are in December 2015 US dollars; “p” refers to the projected 
price per barrel.
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Table 2. GDP derived from mining, quarrying, and oil & gas industries, 2011 constant 
dollars (millions), Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, 
1988–2012.
Year
Canada NL Saskatchewan Alberta
($ M) % GDP ($ M) % GDP ($ M) % GDP ($ M) % GDP
1988 42,455 4 596 4 3,584 11 22,593 18
1989 40,474 4 589 4 3,279 10 21,730 17
1990 41,158 4 476 3 3,258 9 22,216 17
1991 32,622 3 433 3 3,314 10 22,741 19
1992 32,757 3 400 3 3,474 10 24,018 20
1993 33,674 3 397 3 3,835 11 25,816 20
1994 37,759 3 474 3 4,397 12 27,814 20
1995 38,673 3 455 3 4,616 12 28,684 20
1996 45,190 4 467 3 4,742 12 29,802 20
1997 45,010 4 628 4 5,623 14 29,640 19
1998 36,028 3 1,027 7 4,878 12 22,075 14
1999 44,486 3 1,425 9 5,513 13 28,883 18
2000 76,547 6 3,074 17 8,144 18 52,827 27
2001 72,874 5 2,734 15 6,524 15 50,804 25
2002 64,132 4 4,835 24 6,891 16 41,010 21
2003 83,446 6 5,798 27 7,801 17 55,184 26
2004 97,783 6 6,607 29 9,460 19 64,347 28
2005 124,040 8 8,701 35 11,962 23 82,171 31
2006 128,140 8 10,416 38 11,895 23 79,453 29
2007 132,380 8 14,121 44 13,335 23 75,090 27
2008 164,778 9 15,562 46 20,310 28 94,648 31
2009 95,122 6 7,671 29 13,232 21 53,898 21
2010 119,209 7 10,536 35 15,737 24 66,056 24
2011 140,027 8 13,168 39 19,975 27 73,798 25
2012 122,684 7 9,838 31 18,781 25 67,735 22
Note: Income-based estimates of GDP at market prices in 2011 constant dollars (millions).
Sources: CANSIM tables 380-0045, 379-0025, 379-0026, 379-0030; Historical Statistics 
of Newfoundland and Labrador, vol. I (1), Table F-1, Table F-4, and vol. II (IV), Table F-4.
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Table 3. Gross revenues and total budgetary expenditures, 2011 constant dollars 






($ millions) Net Surplus or Deficit
1991–92 4,868 4,471 –398
1992–93 4,917 4,545 –372
1993–94 4,729 4,422 –307
1994–95 4,864 4,684 –180
1995–96 4,744 4,757 13
1996–97 4,618 4,593 –25
1997–98 4,817 4,899 82
1998–99 4,675 4,680 5
1999–2000 4,643 4,614 –30
2000–01 4,720 4,687 –33
2001–02 4,929 4,870 –59
2002–03 4,887 4,843 –44
2003–04 4,995 4,836 –159
2004–05 4,943 4,847 –96
2005–06 5,051 5,643 592
2006–07 5,214 5,371 156
2007–08 5,720 6,891 1,171
2008–09 6,356 8,685 2,330
2009–10 6,824 6,833 9
2010–11 7,144 7,612 468
2011–12 7,097 7,798 701
2012–13 7,019 6,951 –68
2013–14 7,526 6,645 –880
Source: Derived from the Public Accounts and Estimates of the Province; Historical 
Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador, vol. I (1), Table G-2, Table G-3, and vol. 
II (VII), Table G-3.
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Memorial University economists Wade Locke and Doug May, the prov-
ince enjoyed seven years of abundance during which the accumulated 
surpluses totalled $5.1 billion.13 Rather than the perennial question of 
how to deal with the deficit, Williams and his finance ministers had the 
luxury of dealing with the more inviting question of how to deal with 
the surplus. They tried to take a balanced approach to spending on debt 
reduction, dealing with what they had identified as an infrastructure 
deficit, and improving education at both the grade-school and post- 
secondary levels. The latter included maintaining a freeze on tuition 
and a student loan debt reduction program. In 2007, the government 
also reduced the personal income tax rate from the highest to the lowest 
in Atlantic Canada. In his 2008 budget speech, the then Minister of 
Finance, Tom Marshall, did sound a cautionary note: “The fact that 37 
percent of our revenues accrue from non-renewable resources in an 
environment of historically high prices gives me cause for concern.”14
Nevertheless, towards the end of Williams’s premiership, as the 
world economy sank into a serious recession, the government spent 
more in a counter-cyclical attempt to lessen the impact of the recession 
on the provincial economy; and, in keeping with Williams’s promise to 
compensate public servants for the salary freeze during his first years in 
office, the government provided them generous salary increases. 
In later years, many observers were to criticize the Williams gov-
ernment for not establishing a heritage fund based on the Norwegian 
model. This is debatable. In keeping with sound financial advice, they 
did pay down the debt considerably, which is arguably preferable to 
setting up a parallel savings fund while the debt continues to accumu-
late. And strong cases can be made for attempting to address the in-
frastructure deficit, strengthen education and training, and even invest 
in public works in a counter-cyclical attempt to offset the negative 
impacts of the global recession. If the oil revenues bonanza had con-
tinued for many more years, as it had in Norway, a strong case could 
have been made for establishing a heritage fund, but the seven years of 
abundance came to an abrupt end after 2012, by which time Danny 
Williams had retired from politics.
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Renewable Resources: Pulp and Paper, and Fisheries
With the growth of its two main non-renewable resource sectors, 
mining and petroleum, and of the provincial government’s revenues 
from these two sectors, Danny Williams and his government enjoyed 
a healthy fiscal balance sheet during the second half of the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. In the long run, however, renewable resources 
may well be more important. What is often overlooked in reviewing 
the Williams years is that all was not rosy in the province’s two main 
renewable resource sectors, forestry and fisheries.
When Danny Williams became Premier in the fall of 2003, there 
were three pulp and paper mills operating in the province, in Grand 
Falls, Corner Brook, and Stephenville. These mills were all owned and 
controlled by outside multinational corporations, which for many years 
had been operating in a highly competitive industry. In North America, 
branch-plant operations based mainly on fibre from slow-growth for-
ests, which included Newfoundland and Labrador as well as other 
eastern Canadian provinces, were being challenged by plants that ben-
efited from fast-growth forests, particularly in the southern United 
States. The first sign of trouble for Newfoundland and Labrador had 
occurred in the 1980s under the Peckford government. Bowaters an-
nounced its intention to shut down its mill in Corner Brook; and it was 
only through the prodigious efforts of Peckford and some of his senior 
officials that the province was able to effect a sale of the mill to Kruger. 
That mill, under the name Corner Brook Pulp and Paper, has been 
upgraded over the years and continues to operate effectively today.
By the early 2000s, the province’s other two mills were owned by 
Abitibi Consolidated. In 2004 Abitibi gave notice that it was review-
ing its operations in Canada with a view to possibly shutting some of 
its mills, including the one in Stephenville. The Williams government 
set up a working committee of senior officials to meet with the man-
ager of the mill to carry out their own review and work on ways to 
improve its operations. The committee was chaired by the Deputy 
Minister for Forestry at the time. The local managers of the mill were 
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very co-operative and keen to keep the mill going. It was a modern, 
efficient mill and they were optimistic it could be saved. But they were 
wrong. The provincial government offered long-range subsidies worth 
more than $10 million a year. But, from Abitibi’s global perspective, 
although the Stephenville mill was profitable, it was not as profitable 
as some of its other mills. In December of 2005, Abitibi announced 
that it was permanently closing its mills in Stephenville and in Keno-
ra, Ontario. Williams was quoted at the time as saying: “This company 
is an extremely — and this is the nicest possible way I can say this — 
an extremely difficult company to deal with.”15 Williams threatened to 
expropriate the mill and sought but failed to find an alternative oper-
ator. The mill closed, putting nearly 300 people out of work. Stephen-
ville adjusted as best it could. The provincial government supported its 
efforts to attract new businesses to the town. But the main saving 
grace was that many of the skilled workers from the mill were able to 
find alternative, well-paying jobs in Fort McMurray and other main-
land locales. The Stephenville airport is still operating and the head-
quarters of the province’s institute of technology, the College of the 
North Atlantic, is located in Stephenville. Stephenville also continues 
to be a service centre for the Bay St. George region.
The pulp and paper mill at Grand Falls was the oldest mill in the 
province. Established in 1909 by the Anglo-Newfoundland Develop-
ment Company, it was an early success story of the government-of-
the-day’s efforts at diversifying the country’s economy away from its 
almost sole dependence on the fisheries. The mill provided employ-
ment and was the economic base of the thriving town of Grand Falls–
Windsor for 100 years. Its ownership changed hands many times over 
the years. The last owner was AbitibiBowater, which announced in 
2008 that, due to a fall in demand for newsprint, it was consolidating 
its operations in mills closer to its main markets. It closed the Grand 
Falls mill in 2009. Lacking any effective bargaining power to prevent 
this from happening, Danny Williams controversially proceeded to 
expropriate most of the company’s timber and power generation assets 
in Newfoundland. 
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Without really meaning to, however, the government also found 
itself expropriating the mill itself, which was to cost it millions of dollars 
for environmental cleanup.16 AbitibiBowater successfully protested 
the expropriation as being contrary to the rules of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, but it was the government of Canada that 
had to compensate the corporation, not the government of Newfound-
land and Labrador. The closure of the two paper mills, despite the 
provincial government’s best efforts to keep them up and running, 
shows just how difficult it is in practice for a small jurisdiction to be 
“masters in our own house” in an open, global capitalist economy.
Newfoundland and Labrador’s other major renewable resource 
industry, the fisheries, also remained problematic throughout the 
Williams years. Unlike Brian Peckford and Roger Grimes, Danny 
Williams did not include fisheries matters in his own list of major 
priorities. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge their importance and at-
tempted to appoint fisheries ministers who would provide effective 
leadership. This is no small task. All fisheries ministers in Canada’s 
coastal provinces face innumerable difficulties. First and foremost, 
they lack jurisdictional control over the resource for which they are 
held responsible. In addition, particularly in Newfoundland and Lab-
rador, they have to contend with incessant social and political pressures 
from the many individuals, families, enterprises, and communities that 
depend on fish harvesting and processing as the main source not only 
for their market incomes, but also for income support through unem-
ployment insurance. As a former successful fisherman, member of the 
executive committee of the fishermen’s union, and member of the 
Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, Williams’s first choice as 
Fisheries Minister, Trevor Taylor, was well qualified for the challenge. 
Taylor inherited a proposed program meant to bring order and 
stability to the crab fishery, which had become the main fishery in the 
province following the groundfish moratoria. The proposed program 
was called Raw Material Shares (RMS). During the late 1990s, in an 
effort to help offset the negative impacts of the groundfish moratoria, 
the Tobin government had issued several crab-processing licences to 
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inshore plants. This contributed to overcapacity and instability in the 
industry. The intention of the RMS program was to stabilize the indus-
try by capping the amount of raw material that each seafood processor 
could process. Taylor announced that the provincial government in-
tended to implement such a program as a pilot project for two years. 
The Association of Seafood Processors (ASP) welcomed the announce-
ment but the Fisheries, Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAW) 
rejected the proposal outright, fearing that the program would lead to 
more control over the industry by the ASP and weaken crab harvest-
ers’ flexibility to sell their product to whomever they chose. In March 
of 2005, the FFAW began a series of protests, some of which were 
experienced as threatening to Minister Taylor and members of his 
family. In May, Premier Williams commissioned Richard Cashin, 
former president of the FFAW, to review the RMS project and make 
recommendations back to government. Based on his review and meet-
ings he held with the various parties involved, Cashin concluded that 
“RMS was a seriously flawed concept in its proposed application to 
the crab fishery. . . . I concluded that, in the changed nature of today’s 
crab fishery, RMS will not provide the claimed stability or the neces-
sary efficiency improvements. Therefore, it should be dispensed with 
immediately.”17
Cashin had also been asked to comment on what he believed to be 
the underlying problems in the fishery and what should be done about 
them. He concluded that he had become “really struck by how much 
the underlying causes of the current problems in this sector were ini-
tially caused by uncoordinated management decisions by the two levels 
of government, each acting in isolation in its own sphere of influence. 
. . . The causes of the present state of affairs are so intertwined that a 
classic case for joint management of the two sectors is obvious.”18 The 
government accepted Cashin’s recommendation to terminate the 
RMS pilot project. But, although he agreed with it in principle, Danny 
Williams never took up the cause of joint management in the fisheries 
with the same passion he had shown in dealing with the federal gov-
ernment on offshore oil revenues. 
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Williams did not neglect the fisheries, but, like Smallwood and 
other premiers before him, he found that the problems in the fisheries 
seemed intractable. In 2007, he convened a two-day fisheries summit 
of representatives of all the parties involved in the fisheries. Coming 
out of that convention, he initially felt optimistic that they were get-
ting somewhere. He and his government proposed to the province’s 
seafood producers that they should combine to form a common 
marketing agency for Newfoundland and Labrador seafood products, 
taking advantage of the pending sale of the marketing arm of Fisheries 
Products International (FPI).
I felt if we were able to secure the marketing arm of FPI, 
then that could be the glue, we could have singularly mar-
keted Newfoundland and Labrador products. So I went to 
the union and I went to the owners with that and said 
“Look, we’ll put $100 million in here, we’re prepared to step 
up in a big way so that there’s enough money to buy that 
marketing arm of FPI.” I’ll be damned if the owners wouldn’t 
buy it, because the owners had their own, individual vested 
interests. They didn’t want anyone interfering with it.
The Williams government did put some money into fisheries research, 
partly to offset the national government’s “abandonment of fisheries 
research” under Stephen Harper. The government also put money into 
aquaculture development on the south coast and instituted a system of 
custodianship for salmon conservation. On the whole, however, Wil-
liams himself expressed disappointment and frustration over his gov-
ernment’s inability to accomplish more on fisheries development.
I was told right out of the gate by one of the staff, “Look, 
you’ll never solve the fishery, you’ll never do it.” I said, “No, 
no, I’ll do it. I’m gonna tackle it, I’ll get to it.” But she was 
right, you’ll never solve the fisheries problem.
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The other major change that took place during Danny Williams’s 
tenure was the final demise of Fisheries Products International. Estab-
lished as a Crown corporation after the fisheries crisis of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, FPI became a phenomenal success story during the 
mid- to late 1980s, so much so that its CEO, Victor Young, and his 
senior executive were able to take great pride in wiping out the corpo-
ration’s debts to allow FPI to be privatized by the end of the decade. 
Ironically, privatization was the first step towards the ultimate loss of 
control over the company by Young and his team. They managed to 
keep the company going after the groundfish moratoria of the early 
1990s, importing raw material and keeping as many plants going and 
as many people employed as possible, thereby fulfilling as best they 
could what they considered to be their social contract with govern-
ment and the people of the province. This did mean, however, that they 
did not necessarily give primary consideration to the “bottom line” and 
shareholders’ interests, which is the norm for capitalist enterprises. 
Despite the stipulation that no shareholder could own more than 15 
per cent of the shares of the corporation, privatization had opened up 
the possibility of a corporate takeover.
The takeover was spearheaded by John Risley, CEO of Nova 
Scotia-based Clearwater Fine Foods. Clearwater’s first attempt, in 
1999, failed as the government of the day strictly enforced the 15 per 
cent stipulation. Nevertheless, Risley persisted, and by 2001 he and his 
partners, Icelandic Seafood and the Newfoundland fish company, Bill 
Barry Group of Companies, had gained control of 40 per cent of FPI 
shares. Risley also attracted prominent Newfoundlanders, notably 
John Crosbie, to his cause, and at a board meeting in May of 2001, 82 
per cent of the FPI board voted in favour of a corporate takeover, 
with the expectation that the company would become more profitable 
under a new management regime. Newfoundlander Derrick Rowe, a 
proven business leader, was appointed as the new CEO of FPI. Rowe 
was quoted as saying: “We need to communicate to the employees that 
this is a positive change for the company; things are going to be fine.” 
He also noted, “It’s a stability issue now, all this is behind us. We need 
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to take care of our employees and our customers.”19 Subsequently, 
Rowe continued to speak positively but was careful to add the telling 
proviso that the company’s favourable prospects depended on resource 
availability and market conditions. 
Not surprisingly, these conditions turned out not to be so favour-
able, and by the time Danny Williams became Premier, FPI found 
itself in serious financial difficulties. The company turned to the pro-
vincial government and argued that the only way it could avoid bank-
ruptcy was for the government to rescind the 15 per cent rule and 
allow the company and/or its assets to be sold to the highest bidder. 
This led to a prolonged and passionate debate within the provincial 
House of Assembly. Williams and his government were caught between 
a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, giving up on the 15 per cent 
rule meant giving up on Newfoundland and Labrador’s largest fish 
company, which had become one of the largest suppliers of seafood in 
North America. On the other hand, stubbornly refusing the company’s 
request would likely lead to bankruptcy, which in turn would have 
created all sorts of problems for the government and the province’s 
fishing communities.
One possibility would have been for the government itself to buy 
the company and run it as a Crown corporation as it had been initially 
during the early to mid-1980s. As we have seen above, Williams did 
indeed consider this for the marketing arm of FPI, but was dissuaded 
when he couldn’t convince local processing companies to participate in 
creating a co-ordinated marketing agency for the Newfoundland and 
Labrador fisheries. Williams conceded: “We cannot control the actions 
of a company and what its board of directors can do.”20 He recognized 
that their real aim was to strengthen FPI enough for it to be sold off.
The government reluctantly passed Bill 41, An Act to Amend the 
Fishery Products International Act, and what had been one of the 
greatest success stories in the history of the Newfoundland and Lab-
rador fishing industry was lost to the province. The harvesting and 
processing side of the business was bought by a Newfoundland com-
pany, Ocean Choice International, but the marketing arm was bought 
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by High Liner Foods Incorporated based in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. 
Ironically, the name “Fisheries Products International” persists to this 
day, but it now refers to a division of a subsidiary of High Liner called 
High Liner Foods (USA) Inc. based in Danvers, Massachusetts.
Business and Economic Diversification
In their book examining the contention that premiers in Newfound-
land and Labrador are all-powerful, Marland and Kerby conclude that 
“the premier’s power is more limited than many people think.”21 Given 
the limitations of what even a hard-working premier can do alone, 
Williams, like all other premiers, had to depend on other members of 
his team: “You have to rely on your ministers, you have to rely on your 
bureaucracy. You have the ability to appoint your key deputy ministers, 
but some of it is the hand you’re dealt with, and with that comes some 
good cards and some bad cards. That’s how the democratic system 
works, it’s very different from running your own business.”
In an attempt to have at least some control over business develop-
ment, where he could confidently call on his own knowledge and expe-
rience, Williams established a Department of Business that would focus 
specifically on business development and complement the more general 
economic development mandate of the established Department of In-
novation, Trade and Rural Development. Williams recruited from 
outside of government in the person of Ms. Leslie Galway, who had a 
business background, to serve as the deputy minister of the new depart-
ment. Initially, Williams had her report directly to him. The department 
focused first on developing a new, upbeat brand for the province and on 
reducing red tape within the bureaucracy. After two years, Williams de-
cided to appoint a separate Minister of Business, and the department 
focused more on efforts to attract businesses from outside the province 
to move to or set up branch offices in Newfoundland and Labrador.
Although he was interested in economic diversification, this was 
not a priority issue that Williams took on personally. Instead, he ap-
pointed Kathy Dunderdale as his first Minister of the Department of 
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Industry, Trade and Technology, which they renamed the Department 
of Innovation, Trade and Rural Development (INTRD).
Dunderdale was able to hire some excellent people, notably Dennis 
Hogan to become the first Assistant Deputy Minister of Innovation, 
thereby fulfilling half of the blue-book commitment to establish a 
Chief Information/Innovation Office for the province. Hogan took the 
lead in working with the private sector and educational institutes to 
produce an innovation strategy for the province.22 INTRD also took 
the initiative in developing the government’s broadband initiative, 
which leverages government’s own broadband needs to extend broad-
band capability to most regions of the province; instituted and funded 
a Comprehensive Regional Diversification Strategy; and funded a $3 
million Industrial Research and Innovation Fund “designed to encour-
age research into clusters of excellence such as marine technology, 
pharmaceutical research, biotechnology, and the oil and gas industry”23 
to support applied research and development in support of economic 
development initiatives. This was later expanded and set up as a sepa-
rate Crown agency called the Research and Development Corporation.
Dunderdale’s other main thrust was to reinvigorate and strengthen 
the department’s programs of support for small business enterprises 
and rural development. In its 2005 budget, the government announced 
the establishment of a $10 million Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Fund as well as a $5 million Regional/Sectorial Diversification Fund. 
INTRD became the lead agency within government for fostering 
the growth of emergent sectors outside the province’s resource indus-
tries. In 2004, the department developed a Marine Technology Devel-
opment Strategy for the province, with a commitment of $1.5 million 
over five years to help implement the strategy. Other sectors of focus 
were environmental industries and information and communications 
technologies (ICT), where the department worked closely with the 
respective industry associations, the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Environmental Industries Association (NEIA) and the Newfound-
land Association of Technology Industries (NATI), respectively. An-
other emergent sector was aerospace and defence. In 2004–05, the 
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department identified more than 30 companies employing approxi-
mately 1,000 people working in this sector, generating annual sales of 
approximately $80 million.24
It is difficult to determine how effective these initiatives have been 
in helping diversify the province’s economy; but it is noteworthy that 
the provincial economy has become more diversified over the years, 
which is important given the recent decline in its oil and gas industry. 
Poverty Reduction
In addition to its efforts at economic development, the Williams 
government also emphasized the importance of social development. 
For example, it recognized the legitimacy of same-sex marriages in 
December of 2004, and negotiated the New Dawn Agreement with 
the Innu Nation of Labrador in September 2008 that included three 
elements: a land claims agreement-in-principle, compensation for the 
negative impacts of the Upper Churchill project on the Innu, and an 
impacts and benefits agreement for the Lower Churchill project.25
The regime’s claim to be socially progressive is best supported by 
its commitment to poverty reduction in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
In 2003, the province had the second highest rate of people living in 
poverty of all Canadian provinces.26 In a section entitled “Eradicating 
Poverty and Social Exclusion” in their 2003 party platform, the PCs 
stated as follows:
The primary objective of a Progressive Conservative gov-
ernment will be to transform Newfoundland and Labra-
dor over a ten-year period from a Province with the most 
poverty to a Province with the least poverty, comparing 
after tax income and cost of living.27
Based on a research program and consultations with labour and busi-
ness organizations, as well as consultations with people living in poverty, 
the government produced a poverty reduction strategy in June 2006,28 
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taking a long-term, comprehensive, and integrated approach to poverty 
reduction. Over the years, it took several measures aimed at reducing 
poverty, each of which was supported by funding targeted specifically 
to prevent, reduce, and alleviate poverty. Some of the specific action 
items included raising the minimum wage, increasing income support 
payments, reducing the costs of schooling (e.g., by providing text-
books at no cost and improving nutrition through the Kids Eat Smart 
program), and removing disincentives for people on income support to 
join the workforce (e.g., by extending the Low Income Prescription 
Drug Program to cover all low-income families, not just those on in-
come support). In all, as reported in the 2014 Progress Report, over 
100 discrete actions had been taken in support of the poverty reduction 
strategy, with more than $170 million budgeted for poverty reduction 
initiatives.
Was the poverty reduction strategy successful? The answer is that, 
yes, it was, and impressively so. During the period 2003–11, New-
foundland and Labrador went from being the Canadian province with 
the second highest rate of poverty in the country, at 12.2 per cent, to 
being tied with Saskatchewan as the province with the second lowest 
rate, at 5.3 per cent. The latter was significantly lower than the overall 
Canadian rate of 8.8 per cent. In Newfoundland and Labrador, the 
number of people with low incomes in 2003 was 63,000. This had 
fallen to 27,000 by 2011.29 This improvement continued during the 
immediate post-Williams years such that, by 2013, Newfoundland 
and Labrador had achieved the goal set in 2003 of being the province 
with the lowest level of poverty in Canada as measured by Statistics 
Canada’s low income cut-offs.30
An independent academic analysis conducted under the auspices 
of the Ottawa-based Centre for the Study of Living Standards con-
firms, in a rather more sophisticated index that they call Poverty In-
tensity, that the situation in Newfoundland and Labrador improved 
impressively during the first decade of the 2000s. As Figure 2 shows, 
the Index of Poverty Intensity was very low in 1983 (the lower the 
score, the higher the level of poverty intensity), improved somewhat by 
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the late 1980s, worsened again after the groundfish moratoria, but 
then improved dramatically to be better than the Canadian average by 
2012. The success of the poverty reduction strategy was a significant 
achievement.
The Strategic Partnership and Labour Relations
The public-sector strike during Danny Williams’s first year as Premier 
inevitably meant that his relationship with organized labour got off to 
a rocky start. Over the next several years, however, as financial and eco-
nomic conditions improved, this was to change. In the spring of 2004, 
Williams, accompanied by Kathy Dunderdale and some senior public 
servants, embarked on a goodwill and fact-finding visit to the Republic 
of Ireland. Williams, with his Irish Newfoundland roots, was well re-
ceived and fêted and dined in Ireland. While there, he learned about the 




Figure 2. Index of poverty for Newfoundland and Canada. 
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Williams was impressed by what he learned about the Republic’s 
social partnership of labour, business, government, and the community 
sector, which had played a key role in the impressive turnaround and 
growth of the Irish economy during the 1990s.31 Back in the early 
1990s, Newfoundland and Labrador had established its own Strategic 
Partnership initiative, but, despite undertaking some fine research on 
various indicators of competitiveness, the Partnership was experiencing 
a lull at the time. Williams encouraged strengthening the Strategic 
Partnership.
The deputy minister (DM) of INTRD took over as chair of the 
Partnership. The president of the Federation of Labour (at first Reg 
Anstey and later Lana Payne), the chair of the Business Coalition (at 
first Denis Mahoney and later Roger Flood), and the DM formed an 
executive committee. Premier Williams agreed to meet with it regu-
larly to discuss the Partnership and what its members viewed as being 
the major issues of the day. He also agreed to arrange annual meetings 
for the full board of the Strategic Partnership with him and a select 
number of his senior ministers and deputy ministers. Williams found 
this informative, and it was also of benefit to him politically as a means 
to consolidate his ties to the business community and also improve his 
relationship with organized labour.
One of the major strengths of the Strategic Partnership was that 
it served as a forum through which each of its members could engage 
in dialogue, become better informed about key issues facing the prov-
ince, and learn about the reasons behind the other partners’ points of 
view. An important side benefit was that people came to know and 
respect each other in an informal way and develop contacts that could 
be helpful in dealing with issues as they emerged. This was particularly 
important for the labour representatives. It gave them access to gov-
ernment ministers and officials they would not otherwise have had. As 
Lana Payne explains:
When the social dialogue project started there was a real 
understanding and good leadership from all three sectors. 
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I do believe that dialogue is a good thing. Maybe consen-
sus can be created, or at least it will mute discord because 
everybody has a better understanding. The side benefit of 
all of it is that you develop relationships with people. For 
the labour side, I’ll be quite frank, relationships with the 
bureaucracy blossomed during that period. It was a helpful 
kind of problem-solving vehicle.32
Williams’s relations with organized labour improved over the time 
he was in office. He and Reg Anstey, who had been openly critical of 
Williams during the public-sector strike, became more respectful of 
each other through the Strategic Partnership. After Anstey retired and 
was succeeded by Lana Payne as president of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Federation of Labour, Williams supported Anstey’s ap-
pointment to the board of directors of the Canada/Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Directorate. Payne also got to know 
Williams through the Strategic Partnership and felt comfortable deal-
ing with him directly on various issues. Although they often disagreed, 
Payne appreciated that he was approachable and willing to give her 
views a fair hearing.33
Popularity and Leadership
Except for a dip during his first year when he legislated public servants 
back to work, Danny Williams maintained very high ratings through-
out his tenure. Before the 2007 election, his personal popularity was at 
75 per cent, and it continued to reach even higher levels, to over 80 per 
cent just before he announced his retirement from politics in 2010.34 
Williams was flamboyant and dramatic. After he ordered the Canadian 
flag to be taken down from provincial government buildings, Paul 
Martin capitulated on offshore revenues. As the price of oil continued 
to rise, the province’s need for equalization was eliminated and, as 
noted earlier, for the first time in its history Newfoundland and Lab-
rador became a “have province” within the Canadian federation. Most 
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Newfoundlanders attributed the new affluence to Danny Williams 
rather than to the fortuitously rapid rise in oil revenues during the 2000s.
Good fortune was not the only reason for Williams’s popularity. 
As a successful lawyer and businessman, Danny Williams was already 
popular before he entered politics. Indeed, this is the main reason why, 
once he declared his candidacy, it was all but a foregone conclusion 
that he would become Premier. Although born into a professional 
family in St. John’s, he did not inherit most of his wealth but became 
a successful self-made multi-millionaire. Williams was comfortable in 
all social circles: he could sit at boardroom tables as an equal with 
corporate executives, but was just as comfortable playing recreational 
hockey with his buddies. Although born and raised in St. John’s, he 
enjoyed travelling around rural Newfoundland and coastal Labrador. 
He was seen as down-to-earth and by no means a stuck-up townie. 
Not only did he first win a seat in a by-election in the west coast dis-
trict of Humber West, but he continued to represent that district 
throughout his time in office. Like Joey Smallwood during his prime, 
for most Newfoundlanders Danny could do no wrong. 
Popularity, however, is not the same as leadership. What are the 
characteristics that distinguished Danny Williams as a leader? He was 
not a great orator in the tradition of Joey Smallwood and John Diefen-
baker, but he did come across as sincere and passionately committed to 
Newfoundland and Labrador and its people at all levels. Some people 
have criticized Williams for being too dictatorial, too much like Joey 
Smallwood in his style of autocratic leadership.35 Yet Williams was 
keen to build a strong team, including cabinet ministers, policy advi-
sors, and senior public servants. He believed in the democratic system, 
and worked extremely hard to win his majority governments in fair 
elections. Although at times frustrated by the goings-on in the House 
of Assembly, he respected his Liberal and New Democratic opponents 
and the important role they played in political debate. At cabinet 
meetings, he allowed all his ministers to express their views openly and 
freely. At the same time, as the undisputed leader, he had his own 
opinions and his own preferred outcomes to the discussion. In the final 
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analysis, as Premier he had the final say, and this was generally accepted 
as legitimate by his cabinet colleagues.
There were some exceptions. Most notably, one of his high-profile 
ministers, Beth Marshall, resigned from cabinet early in Williams’s 
first term when he decided to intervene in a Victorian Order of Nurses 
strike while Marshall was in Alberta, even though they had previously 
agreed not to intervene.36 Later, former Premier Tom Rideout was to 
resign over a dispute about the transportation budget allocation for his 
constituency.37 On the whole, however, as Matthew Kirby has demon-
strated, the rate of exit from Williams’s cabinets was lower than for 
most previous premiers, and “Williams may have been highly protec-
tive of his ministers, much more so than his predecessors.”38
Williams also stressed the importance of strategic planning. Not 
only was the party’s platform for the 2003 election exceptional in that 
it really did guide the government’s actions for the subsequent eight 
years, but Williams also insisted on their taking a strategic approach to 
planning across a whole plethora of government initiatives. Examples 
include an innovation strategy, a white paper on post-secondary edu-
cation, a skills task force report, a northern strategy for Labrador, a 
climate change action plan, an air access strategy, a long-term tourism 
vision and plan, the government’s broadband initiative, and the poverty 
reduction strategy. In addition, the Williams government required 
every department and agency to develop and submit five-year plans 
with annual updates and justifications for their proposed expenditures. 
All of these planning and strategic initiatives gave a sense of purpose 
and direction to the ministers, deputy ministers, and public officials 
throughout government.
One of Danny Williams’s most striking characteristics as a leader 
was that he was decisive. When unforeseen problems arose, such as a 
hormone receptor test disaster where many women with breast cancer 
were incorrectly diagnosed, he immediately took steps to set up an 
independent inquiry and to see to it that its findings and recommen-
dations were acted on expeditiously. When a senior minister was found 
guilty of misusing public funds, he had no hesitation about firing him. 
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When several members of the House of Assembly were found to be 
misusing their constituency allowances, he insisted that they pay back 
the money and established an independent commission under Justice 
Derek Green to investigate and make recommendations, which were 
acted on by government to guard against similar problems in the future.
By his own admission, Williams hated to lose. In his closing speech 
to his supporters when he announced his retirement, he drew laughs 
and applause when he told them: “you know, I laugh when some critics 
and reporters say that I’m nothing more than a fighter, someone always 
looking for a racket, never happy unless I’m taking someone on. Well, 
folks, I’m here to tell you that those people are right!” In his book 
about Williams and his battles with Ottawa over oil and gas revenues, 
Bill Rowe, who was the province’s representative in Ottawa at the 
time, wrote that Williams’s obsessive drive to succeed in amending the 
Atlantic Accord was irresistible.39
This win-at-all-costs/hate-to-lose attitude was, however, a two-
edged sword. It held Williams in good stead in his dealings with 
Ottawa and the major oil companies over offshore oil revenues. But 
the same attitude led Williams into some excesses as well. He was in-
censed when the then president of Memorial University of Newfound-
land, Axel Meisen, attended a Liberal convention and when Meisen 
opposed Williams’s intention to establish Grenfell College in Corner 
Brook as a separate university. When Meisen resigned, Williams op-
posed the appointment of Eddie Campbell as president, because he 
felt Campbell had been too close to Meisen and his opposition to 
Williams’s hopes for Grenfell, this despite Campbell being a New-
foundlander, which would have accorded with Williams’s maxim that 
we needed to become “masters in our own house.”40 Williams claims 
that he never intended to control the appointment of the new presi-
dent himself, but just “wanted to prevent the succession that was just 
happening that all the old boys are going to keep somebody in there, 
one of their own to perpetuate things. I felt that we needed a whole 
new look in there.” This intervention by the Premier and Minister of 
Education was anathema to academics who cherish academic freedom 
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from political interference as a sacred principle. In the words of one of 
its political scientists, “not only did the government do the wrong 
thing but also they did the wrong thing in a very inept manner.”41
This hate-to-lose attitude also characterized Williams’s behaviour 
towards Stephen Harper. In the lead-up to the 2006 federal election, 
Harper had promised to remove non-renewable resource revenues 
from the equalization formula. But when he won the election Harper 
modified his position and put a cap on how much the province could 
earn. This incensed Williams. In a meeting in Gander in 2006, Wil-
liams raised this issue with Harper and also solicited Harper’s support 
for legislating a time period beyond which a proven offshore oil devel-
opment would revert to the Crown if the operator failed to implement 
the development. According to Williams, Harper got angry and used 
foul language, to which Williams replied in kind. In a somewhat dif-
ferent version of events, Harper’s chief of staff at the time claims that 
the dispute was about equalization and that “Williams’s talk descended 
into foul language.”42
In retaliation, Williams led an ABC (anything but Conservative) 
campaign leading into the federal election of 2008. The ABC cam-
paign was successful in a narrow sense — Harper’s Conservatives 
failed to win a single seat in Newfoundland and Labrador and their 
share of the vote fell from 42.7 per cent in 2006 to just 16.5 per cent 
in 2008;43 but this also meant that the province had no representative 
in the federal cabinet for most of Harper’s tenure.44 As Raymond 
Blake points out, Williams failed to nourish the kind of provincial 
premier/federal minister partnership that had worked so well for Joey 
Smallwood/Jack Pickersgill and Frank Moores/Don Jamieson — or 
even, somewhat more rancorously, Brian Peckford/John Crosbie and, 
later, Clyde Wells/John Crosbie.45 Instead, Williams was very critical 
of the two Newfoundland and Labrador federal ministers who served 
during his premiership. He was scathing about John Efford’s supposed 
weakness on the Atlantic Accord renegotiation, as he was about 
Loyola Hearn’s failure to insist on Canada extending its offshore 
management regime beyond the 200-mile limit to include the nose 
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and tail of the Grand Banks. Both ministers refused to break with 
cabinet solidarity, something that Williams would not have brooked in 
his own cabinet.
Williams bristled at being criticized. He chastised reporters and 
talk show hosts who offered alternative views to his own on such topics 
as the province’s dependency on the oil industry and the proposed 
Lower Churchill hydroelectric project.46 This created an atmosphere 
that several commentators compared to the heyday of the Smallwood 
regime back in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Jerry Bannister, for 
example, “like the Smallwood era, the current period of Conservative 
government has also seen a palpable fear of retribution for speaking 
out politically in St. John’s.”47 Williams tended to equate criticism 
with being unpatriotic, most notably when respected public figures 
such as former deputy ministers David Vardy and Ron Penney dared 
to criticize the Muskrat Falls hydro project.48
Danny Williams’s hate-to-lose attitude also coloured his approach 
to the Lower Churchill hydroelectric project.
An Energy Plan
Newfoundland and Labrador is blessed with abundant energy resources 
— mainly oil and gas, wind and hydroelectricity. How should that 
potential be best realized to serve the people of the province? The Wil-
liams government decided to produce an energy plan to address this 
question. Work began in November 2005 with the release of a discus-
sion paper followed by public consultations around the province. The 
government also received 86 formal submissions and engaged Wood 
McKenzie to provide information about the international context of 
energy developments. The general consensus was that energy prices 
would continue to rise over the period 2016 to 2041, when the Upper 
Churchill contract was due to expire. At the time, the shale oil and gas 
deposits in the United States had not yet been developed, and global 
concerns about the negative impacts of hydrocarbon production on cli-
mate change were not as prevalent as they were to become. The energy 
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plan was released at a time of great optimism in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, at about the mid-point of Danny Williams’s tenure as Premier.
Looking to the future, the central idea of the energy plan was to 
use the substantial revenues the province expected to gain from its 
non-renewable oil and gas resources to fund the development of its 
renewable energy resources, wind and hydro but primarily the latter, to 
ensure the long-term, sustainable supply of energy for the province. 
Unlike in the past, the province itself would be the owner and the 
controller of its renewable energy industry:
As Newfoundland and Labrador’s renewable electricity 
resources will be the foundation for a sustainable economy, 
the province will maintain control over them. Once our 
investments in renewable generation projects are recov-
ered, they can produce electricity at very low cost. Through 
ownership, the people of the province will be the principal 
beneficiaries.
Through these actions, we can deliver a clean, secure 
supply of electricity, a lasting stream of economic benefits 
and a sustainable future for the people of Newfoundland 
and Labrador.49
Although other energy sources are discussed in other sections of 
the energy plan — wind, offshore natural gas, small hydro projects — 
the development of the Lower Churchill hydro project was the main 
focus. The demand for energy in the province was expected to continue 
growing (implying that the various conservation efforts discussed 
elsewhere in the report would have little impact) and that this would 
necessitate the development of the Lower Churchill project:
Both electrical systems in the province have adequate gen-
eration to meet the demand of existing customers. This 
demand is forecast to grow at a fairly steady moderate pace 
over the next several years. This would result in a need for 
new sources of supply on the Island prior to 2015, and 
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later in Labrador. As a result, we plan to develop the Lower 
Churchill project, which will include a transmission link 
between Labrador and the Island.50
While statements at various points in the energy plan indicate that the 
decision to proceed with the Lower Churchill was still tentative, the 
deck was clearly stacked in favour of the Lower Churchill by 2007. 
This was to be the jewel in the crown of Newfoundland and Labrador 
becoming “masters in our own house,” just as the nationalization of 
hydroelectricity, under the rallying cry Maîtres chez nous!, was for the 
Quebec Liberal government in 1962. To take the lead in the imple-
mentation of its energy plan, the Williams government established a 
powerful Crown corporation, later named Nalcor, in June 2007.
Muskrat Falls
In his book about relations between Ottawa and Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Raymond Blake uses a quote from Danny Williams for the 
title, Lions or Jellyfish: “I would rather live one more day as a lion than 
ten years as a jellyfish.” Blake concludes his chapter about the Williams 
government with the favourable overall assessment that “Williams left 
office with a considerable list of accomplishments.”51 Curiously, how-
ever, Blake plays down Williams’s support for the Muskrat Falls hydro-
electricity project. Just a week before he announced his forthcoming 
retirement, Williams and Nova Scotia Premier Darryl Dexter pro-
claimed with great fanfare that the Lower Churchill project would go 
ahead.
It seems to be a mean trick of fate, but most of those who have 
served as Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador since Confederation 
ended their term of office on a low note. For Smallwood, it was the disas-
trous Upper Churchill contract, for Peckford the Sprung Greenhouse 
fiasco, for Tobin it was breaking his promise to serve out a second term of 
office in order to pursue his political ambitions in Ottawa. Danny Wil-
liams seemed to have been an exception to the rule. He was still riding 
42
House
newfoundland and labrador studies, 36, 1 (2021)
1719-1726
high as the most popular premier in Canada when he announced his 
retirement from politics. Even though it proceeded after Williams had 
stepped down, the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project, which has domi-
nated political discourse in the province during the past decade, will con-
tinue to affect Williams’s reputation and legacy in the long term, much as 
the Upper Churchill hydro project has affected Joey Smallwood’s legacy.
The main emphasis of this article has been on the Williams gov-
ernment during his time as Premier. This is not the place for a lengthy 
and detailed review of the Muskrat Falls project. But, because of its 
overriding significance, I will discuss it in a summary way here.
In May of 2010, Quebec’s energy regulator rejected Nalcor’s ap-
plication to transmit power from a proposed Gull Island project via 
Quebec’s energy grid. Unable to negotiate what it would have consid-
ered to be a fair agreement with Quebec for developing the larger Gull 
Island project on the Lower Churchill, the Williams government de-
termined to develop the smaller Muskrat Falls project in a way that 
would avoid Quebec altogether. It would transmit power overland and 
by subsea cables to the island of Newfoundland. This would provide 
the island with a reliable source of clean, renewable energy that could 
operate in perpetuity, guaranteeing a secure supply of energy to resi-
dents. It would have the further advantage of replacing the Holyrood 
generating station, which relied on imported non-renewable oil and 
was responsible for emitting large quantities of hydrocarbons and 
other emissions that contributed to global warming. This sounded 
good in principle and the project had a lot of support initially. As it has 
proceeded, however, many problems, including cost escalation, pro-
duction problems, management deficiencies, and environmental issues 
have emerged to undermine public faith in the project. Ironically, 
given Danny Williams’s determination that, unlike the Upper Chur-
chill project, Quebec would not be the primary beneficiary this time 
around, it now appears that Newfoundland and Labrador’s other 
neighbouring province, Nova Scotia, may be the main beneficiary of 
this project by gaining clean energy at a lower price to its consumers 
than that to be paid by their Newfoundland and Labrador compatriots. 
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The projected cost of the project has escalated from $6.2 billion to 
almost twice that amount, meaning that, without some sort of rate 
mitigation, island Newfoundlanders could see their power bills nearly 
double from around 12 cents to around 23 cents per kilowatt hour. 
The project has also contributed significantly to the provincial 
government’s indebtedness. After the Muskrat Falls project received 
the green light in 2012, the proportion of the provincial budget ear-
marked for the resource sector suddenly increased dramatically. 
Throughout the 2003–10 period expenses under the resource sector 
were just 4–5 per cent of total expenses, but for the 2011–12 budget 
year the actual percentage attributed to the resource sector shot up to 
20.4 per cent, a huge increase over the original estimated budget allo-
cation of 4.4 per cent. This dramatic increase undoubtedly reflects 
the government’s investment in the Muskrat Falls project through 
Nalcor.52 Investigative journalist Russell Wangersky estimated gov-
ernment’s investments in Nalcor in 2015, finding that “the number’s 
truly spectacular — $2.5 billion pumped into the warehouse in just 
eight short years.”53
In 2017 then Premier Dwight Ball announced the establishment 
of a Commission of Inquiry Respecting the Muskrat Falls Project 
under Justice Richard LeBlanc. LeBlanc ran an exhaustive process of 
conducting hearings, receiving submissions, and reviewing related lit-
erature and documents. LeBlanc submitted his report on 5 March 
2020.54 The report is very critical, as its title, Muskrat Falls: A Misguid-
ed Project, indicates. At time of writing, the Muskrat Falls hydro project 
is still not complete, problems continue, the cost continues to rise, 
people are worried about their electricity bills, and, with a sharp decline 
in oil revenues, the provincial government is facing a fiscal crisis. 
Conclusion: A Dynamic Leader for a Dynamic Decade
The escalating costs, time delays, and many legitimate criticisms of the 
Muskrat Falls project have called into question what was otherwise 
viewed as Danny Williams’s highly successful and popular tenure as 
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Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador. Whether or not Williams, 
with his greater understanding of business practices than his successor, 
Kathy Dunderdale, would have sanctioned proceeding with the proj-
ect in 2012 is a moot question. Certainly, he has been unstinting in his 
continued support for the project, and he has argued that, in the long 
run, it will prove to be advantageous to the province and to the coun-
try.  For present purposes, it is important to acknowledge the problems 
of Muskrat Falls, but also to balance this against the substantive ac-
complishments of Williams and his government during the previous 
seven years. 
Of all Newfoundland and Labrador’s premiers since Confedera-
tion in 1949, Danny Williams was undoubtedly the most fortunate. 
His timing could not have been better. After a rough start and a gen-
uine but tough approach to begin to get the province’s financial house 
in order, which occasioned a public-sector strike and back-to-work 
order in early 2004, the price of the province’s oil increased dramati-
cally and remained high throughout Williams’s tenure. The price of oil 
increased from $35.91 a barrel in 2003 to $102.49 in 2008. Provincial 
government revenues increased from $4,836 million in 2003–04 to 
$8,685 million in 2008–09, with government enjoying a healthy sur-
plus of $2,330 million in the latter year.
This positive picture was not due only to good luck. It was also due 
in part to Williams’s successful negotiation of an advantageous Atlantic 
Accord Agreement in 2005 and his negotiation of better terms for the 
province with the multinational petroleum companies operating off-
shore. For the most part, this increase in revenue was spent responsibly. 
The province’s per capita debt was reduced from $24,154 in 2003 to 
$15,366 in 2009. Government expenditures did increase as well, but 
largely to fund important services, including health care and educa-
tion, and to upgrade the province’s aging physical infrastructure. The 
large increases in 2008–09 and 2009–10 were in part due to a counter- 
cyclical attempt to help the province ride out the global recession 
during those years. Williams also agreed to a generous salary increase 
for the province’s public servants after 2008, partly to adhere to a 
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pledge he had made to pay them back for the austerity package he had 
imposed on them in 2004. The Williams government also reduced 
personal and business taxes in a way that has come to haunt the pro-
vincial treasury since the dramatic decrease in the price of oil.
The Williams government’s poverty reduction strategy was im-
pressively successful, with Newfoundland and Labrador going from 
the province with one of the highest poverty rates in Canada to one of 
the lowest. With respect to business development, through the De-
partment of Innovation, Trade and Rural Development, his govern-
ment introduced several new programs to support local businesses, 
especially in rural regions; and the innovation strategy and the estab-
lishment of the Research and Development Corporation boosted the 
province’s emerging technology industry. Intangibly, but nevertheless 
importantly, Newfoundlanders’ and Labradorians’ pride in themselves 
and the province’s standing within the Canadian federation rose per-
ceptibly during the Williams years.
On the other side of the ledger, Danny Williams also had his 
failures and setbacks. He was unable to contribute to the province’s 
fisheries development, with his government’s proposed resource- 
sharing program rejected by fish harvesters, and his attempt to establish 
a co-ordinated fish marketing organization rejected by the processing 
companies. In addition, sadly, his government felt it had no choice but 
to agree to the final dissolution of the once proud Fisheries Products 
International. During Williams’s time in office, two of the province’s 
three pulp and paper mills shut down due to world market forces, and 
the Williams government, despite its “masters in our own house” 
mantra, was powerless to stop them.
Danny Williams’s hate-to-lose attitude proved to be a two-edged 
sword. It stood him in good stead in dealing with Paul Martin and the 
oil industry. But it also caused him to interfere in a non-productive 
way in the selection process for a new president for Memorial Univer-
sity. He was unable to have the same success with Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper as he had had with Paul Martin. He was frustrated 
and enraged by Harper’s refusal to honour his campaign promise to 
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exclude non-renewable resource revenues from the equalization for-
mula; and Williams’s subsequent ABC campaign in 2008 resulted in 
Newfoundland and Labrador having no representation in Harper’s 
cabinet. Some have argued that this same refusal-to-lose attitude also 
contributed to Williams’s decision to support the Muskrat Falls project 
via the inter-island route. Given the historical record of one premier 
after another being unable to negotiate a fair deal with Quebec, this 
is perhaps understandable. But there is no doubt that Williams was 
overly optimistic in his assumptions about the cost of the project and 
its time frame, as well as regarding projections about both domestic 
and export demand for the hydroelectric energy from Muskrat Falls. 
The Williams government’s approach to how to develop the 
Muskrat Falls project was undoubtedly also coloured by its determina-
tion to be “masters in our own house.” Unlike the Upper Churchill 
project, which, despite its faults, was undertaken by Brinco, a private- 
sector consortium, at no cost to the provincial treasury, the Williams 
government’s decision to go it alone through its newly established 
Crown corporation, Nalcor, was a fateful decision that has landed the 
provincial government and its taxpayers with a massive financial bur-
den. Ironically, this project, which he championed at the end of his 
tenure, threatens to undermine the very pride of his people that Wil-
liams strove to champion, not to mention his own long-term reputa-
tion as one of the province’s most successful and popular premiers.
Looking back on it, the decade of the 2000s, with Danny Wil-
liams as its dominant figure, was indeed a dynamic decade.55 For the 
first and only time in its post-Confederation history, Newfoundland 
and Labrador became a “have” province within the Canadian federa-
tion. The age of Newfie jokes was over. The province and its dynamic 
Premier were respected on the mainland. It became a desirable place 
to visit, with tourists from other provinces and other countries coming 
to appreciate the landscape, lifestyle, and culture of Newfoundland 
and Labrador. Whether that, or the ill-fated Muskrat Falls project, 
becomes the main legacy of Danny Williams’s premiership remains to 
be seen.
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